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THOMAS v. COMMONWEALTH
244 Va. 1, 419 S.E.2d 606 (1992)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Douglas ChristopherThomas, 17 years old, was charged in juvenile
court with first degree murder1 in the killing of James Baxter Wiseman
II and with capital murder in the killing of Kathy J. Wiseman as the
premeditated killing of more than one person as part of the same act or
transaction.2 Two offenses of using a firearm3 were also included.
Thomas, who lived with his aunt and uncle, the Marshalls, was
romantically involved with Jessica Wiseman, the fourteen-year-old
daughter of the decedents. The Wisemans were trying to break up the
relationship, and three months before the murder, Jessica was overheard
wishing to "get rid of' her parents. On the day before the murder,
Thomas' twelve-year-old cousin, Lanie, heard the young lovers discuss-
ing specific details of "getting rid of her parents." Thomas also made
several other statements to Lanie concerning the upcoming murder, and
on the Friday evening before the murder, Thomas and Lanie left the
house and smoked some "pot" before Thomas went "over to
Jessica's... to kill two people."
Later that evening, the Marshall household was awakened by
Jessica's pounding on the door, screaming that her parents were dead.
The Marshalls called the authorities. Thomas was interviewed twice by
an agent of the Virginia State Police, and during the second interview,
Thomas confessed to killing the Wisemans.
Two-and-a-half weeks before trial, Thomas moved for dismissal of
all charges against him, alleging that the Commonwealth had intention-
ally destroyed marijuana found among Thomas' possessions. On this
point, Thomas further alleged that the Commonwealth had received
information that he had smoked marijuana laced with PCP before the
murders. Citing Brady v. Maryland
4 and Arizona v. Youngblood,
5
Thomas argued at trial that destruction of the PCP-laced marijuana was
willful concealment of exonerating evidence in violation of Thomas' due
process rights.
Thomas waived both a preliminary hearing and a transfer hearing.
Therefore, his case was transferred from juvenile to circuit court. On
January 28, 1991, Thomas was indicted on the four offenses. He pled
guilty to first degree murder and use of a firearm in the killing of Mr.
Wiseman, and not guilty to the charges of capital murder and use of a
firearm in the killing of Mrs. Wiseman. He was convicted of capital
murder and use of a firearm in the killing of Kathy Wiseman. The jury
sentenced Thomas to four years in prison on the weapons charge, and
after finding "vileness," the jury set Thomas' punishment at death.
On appeal, Thomas argued that under the Virginia statute, 6 a
juvenile cannot waive a transfer hearing when facing capital charges.
The hearing, he argued, is necessary to provide the individual consider-
ation required by the Constitution before ajuvenile can receive the death
penalty. Thomas also argued that the destruction of the marijuana
1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32 (1990).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7) (1990).
3 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-53.1 (1990).
4 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
5 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988).
6 Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-270 (1990).
7 Thomas made numerous additional claims which will not be
discussed in this summary, including claims based on double jeopardy,
denial of continuance, admissibility of photographs,judge or jury capital
sentencing for juveniles, lack of remorse, jury selection, effect of
youthful immaturity on the voluntariness of a confession, and excessive-
constituted a willful concealment of evidence and was a due process
violation under Brady v. Maryland and that the jury's identification of




The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Thomas' conviction and
death sentence, finding no error in any of the issues he raised. On the
issue of the waiver of the transfer hearing, the court held that "the waiver
provision is clearly applicable where ajuvenile is charged with a capital
offense."'8 The court also found "'nothing corrupt or in bad faith' in the
destruction of the marijuana ... Nor [did the court] think Thomas
established that, had the marijuana been subjected to tests, the results
'might have exonerated him."' 9 Also, since the marijuana was in
Thomas' closet, the court found it "unrealistic" to say that the Common-
wealth was involved with any concealment or withholding of evidence
so as to violate Brady.t0 Finally, the court felt the murder of Mrs.
Wiseman involved both the aggravated battery and depravity of mind
necessary to constitute vileness.11
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Waiver of Transfer Hearing
In rejecting Thomas' argument that he shouldn't have been allowed
to waive his transfer hearing under the Juvenile Transfer Statute, 12 the
court relied upon the same language pinpointed by Thomas:
At any time prior to commencement of the adjudicatory
hearing, a child fifteen years of age or older charged with an
offense which if committed by an adult could be punishable
by confinement in a state correctional facility... may elect.
.. to waive the jurisdiction of the juvenile court .... 13
Thomas had argued that because the language spoke of "confinement,"
waiver could not be made where the sentence was death rather than
imprisonment.
The court, however, found no statutory limitation on juveniles
waiving their transfer hearings. Emphasizing that capital murder can be
punished not only through imposition of the death penalty but also by
imprisonment, the court found that the waiver provision was clearly
applicable in the prosecution of all capital offenses. In other words, the
court found that the specific statutory language "could be punished" was
intended to reflect a sentencing possibility, rather than a sentencing fact.
Therefore, in Virginia, the juvenile transfer statute can be waived without
ness or disproportionality.
8 Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 419 S.E.2d 606, 610
(1992).
9 Id. at 19, 419 S.E.2d at 616 (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488
U.S. at 57).
10 Thomas, 244 Va. at 18, 419 S.E.2d at 419 (citing United States
v. Valera, 845 F.2d 923, 927-28 (11th Cir. 1988)).
11 244 Va. at 24-5,419 S.E.2d at 619.
12 Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-270 (1990).
13 Thomas, 244 Va. at 8, 419 S.E.2d at 609 (emphasis added).
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recourse by ajuvenile defendant even though he ends up being sentenced
to death.
II. Destruction of Evidence
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that when evidence in
control of the State is lost or destroyed, the defendant must show bad faith
on the part of authorities and resulting prejudice. 14 The Thomas court,
finding the case at hand to be one of failure to preserve evidence rather
than concealment, 15 found no Youngblood bad faith on the part of the
Commonwealth and, more importantly, emphasized that Thomas had
alleged none either. Further, the court emphasized that Thomas had not
established prejudice resulting from the destruction of the marijuana.
While Thomas argued on appeal that testing the marijuana would have
led to a discovery of PCP-induced behavior (arguably mitigating if not
exculpatory evidence), the court remained unconvinced. The court
found no reasonable probability that even if the evidence had been
disclosed it would have changed the result of the proceeding.
16
The Thomas court once again makes clear to Virginia practitioners
the importance of (1) alleging bad faith when invoking Youngblood for
the destruction of evidence, (2) establishing prejudice resulting from
such destruction, (3) raising evidence issues in a timely fashion, and (4)
arguing the exculpatory or mitigating nature of such evidence at trial.
17
III. Vileness
Beginning in Furman v. Georgia18 and continuing thrqugh Godfrey
v. Georgia19 and Maynard v. Cartright,20 the United States Supreme
Court has consistently stated that the death penalty must not be inflicted
in an arbitrary and capricious manner and that terms such as "vile" or
"heinous" must be sufficiently narrowed so as to inform the jury's
discretion. Despite the court's efforts, however, the dangers inherent in
applying the vileness factor in Virginia remain real. In fact, Virginia's
vileness factor - "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to
the victim" 21 - parallels Georgia's statute as analyzed and criticized in
Godfrey.
22
Clark v. Commonwealth,23 in which the court stated that Virginia's
"vileness" factor has a variety of possible definitions, each of varying
quality, is emblematic of the problems facing Virginia defendants. The
court, for example, has held that proof of any one of the three vileness
factors-torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery-is sufficient
14 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.
15 "Distinguishing the situation where evidence is lost or destroyed
from the circumstance where evidence is concealed, the Supreme Court
held that, 'unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of
the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process of law." Thomas, 244 Va. at 18, 419
S.E.2d at 615 (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). Here the Thomas
court, like the Youngblood court before it, distinguished between con-
cealment, which the court presumed would indicate bad faith, from loss
or destruction (i.e., "failure to preserve"), which the Court did not
presume to be in bad faith without supporting evidence presented by
defendant.
16 Thomas, 244 Va. at 19,419 S.E.2d at 616 (citing United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,682 (1985) (holding that prosecution must give
defendant, upon general request for discovery, all impeachment evi-
dence held by the prosecution)).
17 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58; Bagley,473 U.S. at 682; Brady, 373
U.S. 83 (1963).
18 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,309-310 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
to support a finding of vileness and therefore the death penalty. 24
Virginia courts have defined aggravated battery as "a battery which,
qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum
necessary to accomplish an act of murder" 25 and depravity of mind as "a
degree of moral turpitude and physical debasement surpassing that
inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation.
'26
It was against such a backdrop that Thomas tried to argue that the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to show vileness. Not
surprisingly, given its broad definition of vileness, the court responded
that the murder of Mrs. Wiseman showed both aggravated battery and
depravity of mind. The physical evidence at trial showed that the
Wisemans were shot in the face at close range and that the initial shots
would have been fatal. In shooting Mrs. Wiseman again, the court found
that Thomas aggravated the battery. The Thomas court equated aggra-
vated battery with multiple gunshot wounds "'where there is an appre-
ciable lapse of time between the first shot and the last, and where death
does not result instantaneously from the first." 27 Finally, the court found
depravity in the execution-style of the murders, Thomas' failure to
register remorse or regret, and Thomas' careful planning and premedi-
tation. 28 With any one of the three vileness prongs sufficient to act as an
aggravating factor, the Thomas court's finding that two of the three were
present surpasses the sufficiency test in Virginia.
Generally, the vileness factor in Virginia has been identified as
suffering from at least two constitutional ills. Not only are the words of
the factor too vague to be of meaningful assistance to the sentencer, but
defense counsel are rarely, if ever, notified of the narrowing construc-
tions to be applied by the courts.29 It remains crucial, therefore, that
defense counsel litigate at the pretrial stage how the Commonwealth
intends to use vileness in the case as a means of limiting the scope of
relevant evidence the Commonwealth may use at trial and to preserve
later constitutional claims bars on an invalid use of the vileness factor.
IV. Change of Venue
Thomas appealed the trial court's refusal of his motion for change of
venue. In his motion, Thomas cited a bombardment of pre-trial publicity
as a barrier to a fair trial and had attached thirteen newspaper articles. The
court ruled, however, that while there appeared to be extensive coverage
of the case in the local press, none of the coverage was inflammatory.
Virginia practitioners are reminded that to argue the negative
effects of pre-trial publicity, counsel must argue that widespread preju-
dice is reasonably certain to interfere with a fair trial by an impartial
19 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,432 (1980).
20 Maynard v. Cartright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
21 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
22 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 426. For an analysis of the Virginia
"vileness" factor in light of three current United States Supreme Court
cases, see case summary of Stringer v. Black, Sochor v. Florida, and
Espinosa v. Florida, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
23 Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201,257 S.E.2d 784 (1979).
24 Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423,304 S.E.2d 271 (1983);
Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427,323 S.E.2d 554 (1984).
25 Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149
(1978).
26 Id. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149.
27 Thomas, 244 Va. at .24,419 S.E.2d at 619 (citing Barnes v.
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130,139-40, 360 S.E.2d 196,203 (1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988)).
28 Id.
29 See Lago, Litigating the 'Vileness' Factor in Virginia, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 25 (1991).
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1 - Page 45
jury.30 Further, counsel must establish the need for the change.3 1 For
instance, it would be helpful in establishing need and prejudice to show
publicity concerning any of the following: defendant's confession,
inadmissible evidence, sympathetic information about the victim, wrong
or inaccurate information.
Also of significant interest in Thomas is the court's use of statistics
to counter Thomas' arguments concerning the biased jury pool. Having
determined that in Thomas only 31 percent of the prospectivejurors were
dismissed for bias, the court compared this statistic with that for other
Virginia trials. The court found 31 percent compatible with juror dis-
30 Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 314 S.E.2d 371
(1984).
31 Murphy v. Florida, 471 U.S. 794 (1978).
32 Thomas, 244 Va. at 11, 419 S.E.2d at 611 (citing George v.
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 275, 411 S.E.2d 12, 18 (1991), cert.
missal rates in other Virginia cases (i.e., 20 percent, 37.84 percent, 18
percent, 26 percent). 32 Therefore, the court concluded, "a jury was
selected with relative ease.' 33 Practitioners will want to watch the
court's future opinions to determine whether the use of statistics in an
effort to prove the condition of the jury is an aberration with the Thomas
court or a trend in Virginia appellate review.
Summary and analysis by:
Roberta F. Green
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1591 (1992); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va.
710,717,204 S.E.2d 414,420 (1974); Wansley v. Commonwealth, 210
Va. 462,468, 171 S.E.2d 678,682-83 (1970); Beck v. Washington, 369
U.S. 541, 556 (1962)).
33 Id.
THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT AND PAROLE ELIGIBILITY
BY: CRYSTAL S. STRAUBE
I. INTRODUCTION
"You have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be
punished by death. You must decide whether the defendant shall be
sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life." l In contemplating the
proper penalty for the capital defendant members of the jury are likely to
question if and when the defendant may be released on parole should the
penalty be set at life imprisonment. In fact, it is not uncommon for
Virginia juries to interrupt their deliberations to ask the trial judge about
the defendant's eligibility for parole. 2 The Virginia Supreme Court,
however, consistently has refused to provide any explanation to jurors,
contending that parole is of "no concern." 3 The Virginia Supreme
Court's answer itself is of concern, given that juror misperceptions on
parole often prove to be a critical factor in the sentencing determination.
4
Although the mandatory minimum sentence in Virginia for capital
murder is twenty-five years imprisonment,5 studies reveal that people
believe that a capital defendant, if sentenced to life imprisonment, will
serve only seven to ten years in prison before being released on parole.
6
1 Va. Model Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 34.120, (1991). See
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4 (1991).
2 SeeDelongv.Commonwealth,234Va.357,370,362S.E.2d669,
776 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1100 (1988); Poyner v. Common-
wealth, 229 Va. 401,432,329 S.E.2d 815,836, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865
(1985); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289,296,302 S.E.2d 520,
525, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223
Va. 41, 54-55,286 S.E.2d 172,179-80 (1982); Clark v. Commonwealth,
220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784, 792 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049
(1980); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260,278,257 S.E.2d 808,
821 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980); Jones v. Commonwealth,
194 Va. 273, 275, 72 S.E.2d 693, 694 (1952).
3 Cowardv. Commonwealth, 164Va.639,646,178S.E.797,799-
800 (1935); Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492,494-95,247 S.E.2d
704, 706 (1978).
4 For a comprehensive analysis of jurors' misperceptions, see
Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors: Misperceptions Concerning Parole
in the Imposition ofthe Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 211
(1987)[hereinafter Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors].
5 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(C)(1991). A capital defendant's
sentence may be reduced for good conduct in prison, but even with the
maximum reduction possible the defendant must serve twenty-one years
'In 1988, the National Legal Research Group issued a report that the
typical jury-eligible citizen living in Edward County, Virginia believes
that a defendant sentenced to "life" for a murder during the commission
of a robbery will serve only ten years before being released.
7
These misperceptions may lead a juror to choose death because of
a belief that a life sentence would allow the defendant to be released after
serving just a few years. One study, for example, indicated that more than
two-thirds of those questioned would be more likely to favor a life
sentence over a death sentence if they knew the defendant would have to
serve at least 25 years before becoming eligible for parole.8 Clearly, a
jury's ability to distinguish between the myth and the reality of parole
eligibility carries vast consequences for capital defendants in Virginia.
This article looks at the defendant's right to introduce evidence of
parole in the capital murder trial from five different aspects: (1) Virginia
law and policy on the introduction of parole evidence; (2) the defendant's
right to question or educate jurors on parole during voir dire; (3) the
defendant's right to present evidence concerning parole eligibility as a
potential mitigating factor; (4) the right to introduce parole evidence in
and nine months in jail before even being considered for parole eligibil-
ity. Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-199 (1991). This section states that a defendant
sentenced to life shallbe eligible forup to five days credit foreach 30 days
served. Thus, a person convicted of capital murder can receive up to three
years and three months good conduct credit.
6 See, e.g., Hood, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and
Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 Va. L.Rev. 1605, 1624
(1989) [hereinafter, Hood, The Meaning of "Life"] (citing National
Legal Research Group, Inc., Jury Research and Trial Simulation Ser-
vices, Report on Jurors' Attitudes Concerning the Death Penalty (Dec.
6, 1988) [hereinafter NLRG Report]).
This study was completed for and utilized in Turner v. Common-
wealth, 234 Va. 543,364 S.E.2d 483 (1988). See also, Paduano & Smith,
Deathly Errors (citing Codner, The Only Game in Town: Crapping Out
in Capital Cases Because of Juror Misconceptions About Parole (Jan.
24, 1986) (unpublished study supervised by the Southern Prisoners'
Defense Committee) [hereinafter Codner, The Only Game in Town]).
7 Hood, The Meaning of "Life," at 1606 (citing NLRG Report,
Question no.4, at 3).
8 SeePaduano & Smith,DeathlyErrors, at223 (citing Codner, The
Only Game in Town, 45, n. 114).
